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Abstract. This paper explores the resistance of MOS Current Mode
Logic (MCML) against attacks based on the observation of the power
consumption. Circuits implemented in MCML, in fact, have unique char-
acteristics both in terms of power consumption and the dependency of
the power proﬁle from the input signal pattern. Therefore, MCML is suit-
able to protect cryptographic hardware from Diﬀerential Power Analysis
and similar side-channel attacks.
In order to demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent logic styles against
power analysis attacks, two full cores implementing the AES algorithm
were realized and implemented with CMOS and MCML technology, and
a set of diﬀerent types of attack was performed using power traces de-
rived from SPICE-level simulations. Although all keys were discovered for
CMOS, MCML traces did not presents characteristic that can lead to a
successful attack.
1 Introduction
During the past ten years, a number of new techniques for attacking imple-
mentations of cryptographic algorithms have been discovered. These techniques
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exploit information leaking from a device (e.g., a smart card) while data is being
processed. The term side-channel attacks summarizes all possible ways of col-
lecting the leaked information: power consumption, timing, and electromagnetic
emission are possible examples [MOP07]. Side-channel attacks which exploit the
power consumed by a device were reported for the ﬁrst time in 1999 by Kocher
et al [KJJ99]. The power consumption of a device strongly depends on the data
being processed, thus leaks information about the secret key. Among the diﬀer-
ent types of power-based attacks available in literature, the most common are
Simple Power Analysis (SPA) and diﬀerential power analysis (DPA). The latter
and its powerful variant called correlation power analysis (CPA) are of particular
interest since they do not require speciﬁc knowledge about the implementation
of the target device to be eﬀective.
In this paper we present a design ﬂow that enables the evaluation of Power
Analysis Attack resistance and using it we demonstrate the robustness of a spe-
cial logic style, namely MOS Current Mode Logic (MCML), against such attacks,
considering in particular SPA and CPA. Previous papers on this subject just ar-
gued robustness qualitatively or required hardware manufacturing to prove it.
Contrary to past works, we evaluate the robustness of MCML with real attacks
and without the need for manufacturing prototypes. To achieve this result, we
developed a design ﬂow and a SPICE-level simulation environment derived from
the one presented by Bucci at al. [BGLT04], that allows collection of power
traces in reasonable time, thus enabling a more direct experimental study of the
resistance of complex blocks, such as entire cryptographic cores. As a result, our
traces are much closer to the circuit real behavior than those obtained simulating
only small portion of a core. A clear advantage of the proposed simulation-based
evaluation is that in this way it is easy and thus possible to iterate the design
ﬂow to investigate further points of optimization before the fabrication of the
real chip.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses related
work, Section 3 overviews the AES algorithm, and Section 4 describes MCML
technology. The design ﬂow, including simulation-based power analysis, is ex-
plained in Section 5, and simulation results are presented in Section 6. Finally,
conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
2 Background and Related Work
Side-channel cryptanalysis has emerged as a serious threat for smart cards and
other types of embedded systems performing cryptographic operations. It was
demonstrated in a number of publications that side-channel attacks are an ex-
tremely powerful and practical tool for breaking unprotected (or insuﬃciently
protected) implementations of cryptosystems. These attacks exploit the fact that
the execution of a cryptographic algorithm on a physical device leaks informa-
tion about sensitive data (e.g., secret keys) involved in the computations. Many
sources of side-channel information have been discovered in recent years, includ-
ing the power consumption and timing characteristics of a cryptographic algo-
rithm [Koc96, KJJ99], as well as deliberately introduced computational faults
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[BS97]. Simple Power Analysis (SPA) uses the leaked information from a single
computation, while Diﬀerential Power Analysis (DPA) utilizes statistical meth-
ods to evaluate the information observed from multiple computations [KJJ99].
Currently, there exists no perfect protection against DPA attacks. However, by
applying appropriate countermeasures, it is possible to make the attacker’s task
more diﬃcult and expensive.
A multitude of so-called DPA-resistant logic styles have been proposed during
the past ﬁve years. The idea behind these logic styles is to tackle the problem of
side-channel leakage at its actual root, namely at the hardware level. The power
consumption of circuits realized with DPA-resistant logic cells is uniform and, in
the ideal case, independent of the processed data and the performed operations.
The ﬁrst concrete implementation of a DPA-resistant logic style was reported by
Tiri et al. in 2002 [TAV02]. Their Sense Ampliﬁer Based Logic (SABL) combines
the concepts of dual-rail logic and pre-charge logic [MOP07]. SABL cells have a
constant power consumption, provided that they are designed and implemented
in a carefully balanced way. All SABL cells of a circuit are connected to the clock
signal and become pre-charged simultaneously, which causes very high current
peaks. Furthermore, SABL cells require at least twice as much silicon area as
conventional CMOS cells and suﬀer also from high delay. Besides the logic cells,
also the wires connecting these cells must be routed in a special balanced way
to achieve a uniform power proﬁle.
The present work improves on the results of our previous work [RBE+07] in
several substantial ways. Below is a list of the main diﬀerences along with a brief
explanation.
– The custom design ﬂow for MCML has been completed. Thus, it is now
possible to start from the same HDL netlist for both CMOS and MCML,
rather than completely design by hand the netlist for the latter case.
– The simulation ﬂow has been extended in order to support a back-end de-
sign phase. This task, particularly challenging for MCML technology, has
been carried out for all analyzed circuits. Net parasitics have been extracted
into SPEF ﬁles and back-annotated on the netlists. Although this increased
the simulation time, results mimic more closely the actual behaviour of the
fabricated device.
– Full cryptographic cores (implementations of the AES block cipher algo-
rithm) have been considered as targets of the attacks. This has surely a
negative impact on simulation speed, but is representative of a typical real
attack. This step was made possible by the level of maturity reached in the
simulation ﬂow.
Additionally, note that post-processing and stimuli writing procedures have
been fully automated, the same has been done for the simulation and attack
routines that have also been extended to support Simple Power Analysis
attacks.
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3 Overview of the AES Algorithm
In this section we provide an overview of the Rijndael (AES [IoSTN01]) algorithm
and some highlights on its possible implementation, focusing on the two that we
used.
The Rijndael algorithm implements a block cipher for symmetric key cryp-
tography, supports a key size of 128, 192 and 256 bits, and allows for a block
size of 128 bits. Every block is represented using 32-bit words. The number of
words that compose the input block is equal to 4, while the length of the key
can be a sequence of 128, 192 and 256 bits, and can take the values 4, 6, or 8,
which reﬂects the number of words the key is composed by.
The algorithm works on a two dimensional representation of the input block
called state, that is initialized to the input data block and holds the intermediate
result during the cipher and decipher process, and ultimately holds the ﬁnal
result when the process is completed. All the transformations of the algorithm
are grouped in a single function called round. The round is iterated a speciﬁc
number of times that depends on the key size; speciﬁcally, for a key length equal
to 128, 192 or 256 the number of rounds is equal to 10, 12 and 14, respectively.
The encryption process starts by copying the input block into the state array,
followed by the ﬁrst key addition. In the encryption process, the round function
is composed by four diﬀerent transformations. ShiftRows cyclically shifts to left
the bytes in the last three rows of the state with diﬀerent oﬀsets. SubBytes
(or S-box) operates independently on each byte of the state and is composed
by the multiplicative inverse in the ﬁnite ﬁeld GF(28) followed by an aﬃne
transformation over GF(2). MixColumns multiplies modulo x4 + 1 the columns
of the state by the polynomial {03}x3 + {01}x2 + {01}x + {02}. AddRoundKey
adds the round key to the state. To generate all the needed round keys, the AES
algorithm takes the secret key k and performs the expansion routine to generate
a total of Nb×(Nr+1) words. The round transformations are cyclically executed
at every round: all the Nr rounds are identical with the exception of the ﬁnal
round, which does not include the MixColumns transformation.
Decryption is similar to the encryption process and uses the same basic trans-
formations, but inverted. The key schedule is identical to the one described for
the encryption process but starts with the last round key.
Many alternatives are available when implementing an AES core, the choice
among them being driven by application constraints and by performance, area,
and power trade-oﬀs. Our goal is to estimate the level of robustness given by
the MCML technology with respect to the CMOS one, thus instead of attacking
a single implementation of the block cipher, for each of the two attacks we
considered a diﬀerent core, selected to perform this evaluation in the best possible
conditions for the adversary. The two considered AES implementation have a
datapath of 128 and 32 respectively. In the ﬁrst core considered, a single register
of 128 bit is used to store the result of the ﬁrst key addition and the results
of the rounds computation, and the key is unrolled on the ﬂy, while ciphering
the data. The latter has a number of 32-bit registers that are used to store
the result of each transformation inside the round, with the only exception of
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the shift rows. In this implementation, all the round keys are computed before
starting ciphering.
4 Design of DPA-Resistant Functional Units Using
MCML Gates
The circuit-level implementation of DPA-resistant logic gates requires systematic
use of circuit techniques that (i) have signiﬁcantly reduced power supply current
levels, (ii) do not produce prominent current spikes or ﬂuctuations during the
switching events, and (iii) do not exhibit a signiﬁcant input pattern-dependence
with respect to current drawn from the power supply [TV03]. It is worth not-
ing that the classical CMOS logic gates do not fare particularly well in any of
these categories, and therefore, are not considered to be a good choice for DPA-
resistance, in general. Standard CMOS digital gates are notorious for generating
sharp and input-pattern dependent current pulses (also referred to as delta-I
noise [GR99, AAE02]) due to charging and discharging of the gate’s parasitic
capacitances and fan-out.
Due to the diﬀerential and current steering nature of the its logic style, Current
Mode Logic (CML) reduces the generated switching noise by about two orders
of magnitude [TAY+05, MKA92]. The low delta-I noise generation makes the
CML style an excellent candidate for DPA-resistant logic gate design.
In detail, a MOS Current Mode Logic (MCML) gate consists of a tail current
source, a current steering logic core, and a diﬀerential load, as shown for the
simplest MCML gate, the MCML buﬀer, in Figure 1. The operation of MCML
circuits is based on the principle of re-directing (or switching) the current of a
constant current source through a fully diﬀerential network of input transistors,
and utilizing the reduced-swing voltage drop on a pair of complementary load
devices as the output. A logic inversion without additional delay is possible by
simply exchanging the diﬀerential terminals. The operation principle already
suggests that the power consumption is static (the circuit must dissipate the
same amount of current continuously) regardless of the switching activity and
fan-out conditions. True diﬀerential operation of the circuit with small output
voltage swing ensures fast switching times. Note that the propagation delay is
proportional to the output swing, and independent of the power supply voltage.
Other advantages include better noise immunity compared to classical CMOS
logic circuits, and signiﬁcantly less switching noise.
The supply current ﬂuctuation in MCML gates is typically 5% of the nominal
tail current during switching events. Figure 2 shows the simulated current varia-
tion of an MCML buﬀer for a fan-out of 5. MCML circuits are also more robust
against common-mode ﬂuctuations (power supply noise) due to their inherent
common-mode rejection as a result of full diﬀerential signaling property.
From the DPA-resistance point-of-view, it can be seen that the supply-current
variation of the MCML gate will remain signiﬁcantly smaller during switching
events, compared to that of a conventional CMOS gate. At the same time, the
magnitude of the supply-current variation is largely independent of the applied
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Fig. 1. Schematic of an MCML buﬀer (or
MCML inverter, depending on the out-
put signal deﬁnition)
Fig. 2. Simulated gate delay and supply
current ﬂuctuation of an MCML buﬀer
for a fan-out of 5
input vector, as well as of the fan-out load capacitance. The amount of static
current dissipation can be reduced dramatically while preserving all of the ad-
vantages concerning the DPA-resistance, at a lower speed, when the transistor
sizing is done to satisfy modest speed constraints (e.g., a typical switching speed
of 400MHz). It was shown [TAY+05] that the peak current ﬂuctuation of the
classical CMOS realization is in the order of 28mA, while the current ﬂuctua-
tion of the MCML version remains conﬁned to a narrow band of about 0.5mA,
around the constant value of 11.5mA. A more detailed analysis was performed
by modelling also the measurement set-up: a probing instrument having a low-
pass ﬁlter characteristic and the ﬁltered output was monitored. As expected,
the design based on CMOS logic still shows large variations (400μA peak), suﬃ-
cient to be distinguished quite easily. On the other hand, the maximum current
ﬂuctuation in the MCML-based design remains below 25μA, further increasing
DPA-resistance of the security-critical block.
Besides being beneﬁcial from the security point of view, usage of the MCML
technology also poses additional constraints while designing secure devices. The
main drawbacks regard the area requirements, MCML gates are generally 1.5
to 2 times larger than their CMOS counterparts. The power consumption is
also higher, particularly for low operating frequencies, where the constant power
consumption of the MCML gates does not oﬀset the dynamic switching power
of the CMOS gates. In particular, this increased consumption can adversely
aﬀect the current budget in power-constrained devices such as smart cards or
cryptographic tokens. When low power is a design constraint, it may become
necessary to isolate the areas of the design which are critical from the point of
view of security and implement them using MCML gates, the rest of the circuit
being realized using standard CMOS libraries. This approach obviously increases
the complexity of the back-end design phase, as it introduces the need to deal
with multiple technology libraries.
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5 Design and Simulation Flow
The robustness of a hardware implementation of a block cipher against power
analysis attacks can be evaluated by means of circuit simulation at diﬀerent stages
of the design ﬂow. The decisive proof is obtained when the actual fabricated mi-
crochip is attacked using high frequency probes and an oscilloscope; nonetheless,
mounting an attack using the current traces obtained from transistor-level simula-
tion can be useful to get a good approximation of the actual level of Power Analysis
resistance, and an indication of possible sources of weakness.
The simulation techniques used by designers for this robustness evaluation are
typically divided in two groups: at the analog level or at the logic level [MOP07];
the ﬁrst provides higher precision, while the second is faster. A common way of
achieving the best of two worlds, i.e., precise results while keeping the simula-
tion speed high, is to divide the circuit into blocks and simulate at the SPICE
level only the parts under analysis. Although this approach provides results with
good approximation, the problem with limiting the simulation to only parts of
the circuit is that one eliminates the contribution of the algorithmic noise to the
power consumption (the noise produced by all components of the circuit that
are not targeted by the attack hypothesis). The only way to obtain a more real-
istic situation is to simulate the entire core, but this raises two main challenges:
the required simulation time and the capability of the simulation ﬂow to han-
dle complex designs automatically. Indeed, automation is of capital importance:
while it might be possible to manually adapt a small portion of a cryptographic
core, it is certainly not so for a complex design.
To achieve both goals of fast simulation time and high accuracy, we developed
an automated ﬂow based on existing tools and described in the following. The
actual design ﬂow presents some diﬀerences for the two cases of CMOS and
MCML; even though the RTL description of the core is the same, the ﬂow of
generating the netlist and the extraction of parasitic is diﬀerent for the two
considered technologies.
In the CMOS case, an HDL description of each of the cores under attack has
been synthesized using Synopsys Design Compiler on the UMC 0.18μm process.
Placing and routing phases are carried out using Cadence Design Systems SoC
Encounter, and a parasitic information ﬁle is produced along with the verilog
netlist of the circuit. These are used together with the SPICE models of the
technology cells to run a transistor level simulation using Synopsys Nanosim.
The employed transistor models are the BSIM3 p-MOS and n-MOS models.
In the MCML case, the standard ASIC design ﬂow has been extended by intro-
ducing a complete library with views for transistor level simulation (schematic),
schematic capture (symbol), synthesis (lib), placement and routing (abstract),
and physical design (layout). It is worthwhile here to discuss the way in which
this library has been built and under which aspects the extended ﬂow is diﬀerent
from the standard CMOS ﬂow; for a more comprehensive discussion the reader
is referred toas the work of Badel at al. [BGI+08].
We ﬁrst describe the process of the MCML logic cell generation. Generally
speaking, the logic function implemented by an MCML diﬀerential cell is given
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by the network of nMOS transistors (e.g. M1 and M2 in Figure 1); thus, as a ﬁrst
step, a basic set of nMOS networks (called footprints) has been created. Since
the speed characteristics of the cell are adversely impacted by the number of lev-
els of nMOS transistors in the footprint, a limit of 3 levels was considered. The
basic set comprises 19 diﬀerent footprints, which by exhaustive search have been
found to be suﬃcient to implement all functions that can be mapped to 3-level
MCML gates. Starting from the set of footprints, we can explore all diﬀerent
ways of assigning logic inputs to the transistor gates; 63 unique functions with
1 to 7 input variables are produced in this way, as well as 45 redundant func-
tions, whose cell realizations present diﬀerent electrical characteristics. Thus, a
total of 108 standard cell templates are obtained. As a last step, we exploit a
property of the diﬀerential cells for which a switching of the diﬀerential (input
or output) pins results in a complementation of the associated boolean variable.
We extensively apply this transformation and obtain a total of 4660 diﬀerential
cells describing diﬀerent logic functions that make up the core of the dedicated
technology library.
In a typical design ﬂow, diﬀerent realizations of the same logic cells charac-
terized by diﬀerent driving strengths are usually needed; in the MCML case,
switching speed is directly proportional to the amount of static current injected
by the current source. Thus, by simply scaling the footprints of the cells we
easily obtain such variants that will be added to obtain a rich and versatile cell
library.
A second important process is the generation of a so-called fat library, in
addition to the fully diﬀerential library. The two libraries share the same cell
footprints and electrical characteristics, but the former contains single-ended
(non diﬀerential) variants of the cells; this library is the one actually used during
the synthesis and place&route phases. The reason is that modern place&route
tools treat diﬀerential wires as diﬀerent variables, which are thus routed in the
layout in diﬀerent ways; as a result the diﬀerential pair will typically undergo
diﬀerent noise contributions, and will suﬀer from mismatches in the capacitive
loads. When the place&route phase has ended, the fully diﬀerential library is
used for the layout phase; the single-ended cells are replaced by the diﬀerential
ones (with zero impact on the footprint) and the single-ended wires are cut into
pairs of wires which are thus (by-design) always side by side in the chip layout. Of
course to render this step seamless, the cell input/output pins must be designed
in an opportune way so that connections with the diﬀerential wires are easily
introduced; an exact description of this achievement can be found in the work of
Badel et al [BGI+08]. The result of the full process is an extended design ﬂow,
ranging from RTL design to layout, that can be used to design fully-diﬀerential
MCML digital circuits with enforced diﬀerential routing. We use the output of
the place and route phase along with the MCML technology SPICE models to
run transistor level simulations of the full circuit.
As already mentioned, analog simulation can be done on netlists produced
by diﬀerent stages of the design ﬂow. A ﬁrst possibility is to use the current
traces obtained from a post-synthesis power simulation. This approach allows
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evaluation of circuit DPA resistance at a very early stage. However, the current
traces obtained are rather inaccurate, because the contribution to the power
consumption of the wire loads and parasitics is not considered. Depending on
the attack point, such a consumption can have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the side-
channel resistance. Therefore, going one step further, and using the outputs of
place&route tool for simulation, allows us to obtain power traces that are much
more realistic.
In our work, we have decided to run accurate transistor-level simulations of
the post-place&route netlist, at very high timing resolution (about 10ps) and
with no additional noise coming from the measurement device or the environ-
ment. From one point of view, this is a best-case condition for an attacker; on
the other side there are certainly some physical eﬀects that cannot be correctly
modeled, for instance crosstalk between adjacent nets or variations in the man-
ufacturing process. A worthwhile-mentioning advantage of simulations is that in
this way it is also possible to iterate the design ﬂow to investigate further points
of optimization.
We would like to underline that simulation results of Nanosim are compara-
ble to those of SPICE (when Nanosim is set to run with full capabilities), but
the simulation process requires signiﬁcantly less time to be carried out. This is
beneﬁcial not only because the number of possible design iterations is greatly
increased, but also because it enables simulation and veriﬁcation of the robust-
ness of complex designs such as an entire cryptographic core. Results obtained
by simulating only a small portion of a core can miss a correct simulation of
algorithmic noise as well as correct wire loads and parasitics, while simulation
results of an entire cryptographic core are much closer to the real behavior of
the circuit.
6 Resistance against Power Analysis
In this section we describe the attacks we mounted on the CMOS and MCML
implementations of AES core and we compare the results. In this work we focused
on attacks based on the analysis of the power consumption, and in particular
in the two powerful ones: Simple Power Analysis (SPA) and Diﬀerential Power
Analysis (DPA).
In an SPA, an attacker measures the power consumed by a device while per-
forming cryptographic operations and, by observing the traces, deduces informa-
tion produced either by the Hamming weight leakage or by the transition current
leakage. Both of them are justiﬁed by the fact that the amount of current is di-
rectly proportional to the Hamming weight of the processed data, hence it can be
derived. DPA attacks, on the other hand, are more eﬀective than SPA attacks,
but also more diﬃcult to mount. A typical DPA attack consists of four steps:
At ﬁrst, an intermediate key dependent result is selected as the target, then
the attacker encrypts (decrypts) a certain number of known plaintexts (cipher-
texts) and measures the corresponding power consumption traces. Subsequently,
hypothetical intermediate values are calculated based on a key guess and they
are used as input of a selection function. This function is used to partition the
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power traces into sets, depending on the values of the intermediate results. The
diﬀerence of means of the two sets is then calculated and a peak is clearly visi-
ble for the right key hypothesis in correspondence to the time frame where the
information is leaked.
An improvement with respect to DPA attack, called correlation power anal-
ysis (CPA), was discussed in [BCO04]. It hypothesizes the Hamming weight or
the distance of Hamming of the targeted register and evaluate the hypothesis
statistically. Usually CPA shows better results than the original DPA because it
uses hypotheses based on multiple bits rather than the single bit typical of DPA.
The statistical correlation ρ(P (t),H) between the power traces Pn(t) and the hy-
pothesis H is a normalized value between −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 where ρ = 1 (ρ = −1)
means that the variables P (t) and H are perfectly correlated (anti-correlated)
and ρ = 0 means there is no correlation at all. The strongest correlation corre-
sponds to the right key hypothesis.
Mounting the Attacks
Using the simulation ﬂow described in Section 5, we obtained the power traces for
attaking the AES algorithm described in Section 3. It is important to notice the
diﬀerences between the simulated and the real attack. In a real environment,
an attacker has to collect a huge number of traces in order to ﬁlter out the
noise. In fact, when power consumption of any device is measured, the collected
traces include noise, both thermal and algorithmic, the latter is produced by
other components of the device. Since it is an uncorrelated normally distributed
random variable, the noise can be ﬁltered out by increasing the number of traces.
The simulation environment we used is partially noise free: only algorithmic noise
is present into the traces. Furthermore, the simulation was performed with a very
high resolution both for the current (1μA) and the time (10ps), which is the best
possible condition for an attacker.
To evaluate the resistance against the power based attacks, we considered
the two most powerful univariate ones: the Simple Power Analysis Attack, and
the powerful variant of Diﬀerential Power Analysis based on correlation. This
decision is coherent with the goal of the paper: we aim to provide a realistic evalu-
ation of Power Analysis resistance by means of simulation for MCML and CMOS
rather then attack a speciﬁc implementation of a cryptographic algorithm. Since
none of the considered logic styles oﬀer masking schemes, practically there would
not be any beneﬁt in considering attacks of higher order. We thus concentrate
on the SPA and CPA and we selected for each of the attacks a core that would
represent the best possible situation for the attacker and we realized each of the
two cores using both of the technologies. For the same reason, we decided to
use as attack point a register, since is well known in literature that this is the
easiest point for mounting an attack (because the signals are synchronized by
the clock)[MOP07].
The ﬁrst evaluation was done performing a Simple Power Analysis attack:
in the target core of this attack, the output of the ﬁrst key addition is stored
into a register. As depicted in Figure 3, our SPA attack targeted that register.
Coherently with the purpose of this paper, with this attack we are interested in
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Fig. 3. Point of attack for SPA Fig. 4. Point of attack for CPA
verifying if the MCML logic, that is fully diﬀerential, is suﬃcient to protect the
circuit rather then the robustness of a speciﬁc implementation under test.
The attack was performed bit by bit. After the application of a reset signal,
that sets all ﬂip-ﬂops in the register to zero, we applied a plaintext in which
all bits were set to logical 0. The result of the xor of this input with the secret
key was then stored in the register and the power consumption in this point
was measured. A second measure was performed as the ﬁrst, with the only
diﬀerence that one bit of the input plaintext was changed from 0 to 1. The two
traces obtained for CMOS are plotted in Figure 5, that present the two measure
overlapped. As is possible to see, the trace corresponding to the plaintext with
the bit set to 1 has a higher power consumption with respect to the same situation
when the plaintext is 0. This clearly indicated that the value of the secret key
in corrispondence to this speciﬁc bit is 0. By iterating this procedure for all the
bits of the key, it is possible to reconstruct all the correct values of the secret
key by simply looking at the diﬀerence between the reference power trace with
the plaintext all zero and the one with a bit set to 1 in corrispondence to the
target bit of the key.
The same attack was perfomed on the same AES core implemented using
MCML technology. As can be seen from Figure 6, the two traces corresponding
to the plaintext 0 and the plaintext with the target bit set to 1 are completely
overlapped and thus is impossible to derive the value of the key bit.
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A second evaluation of the MCML resistance was done mounting a CPA.
For this purpose we used a 32 bit datapath AES core, and we targeted the
register that stores the output of 4 S-boxes, as depicted in Figure 4. To mount
the attack, we used a selection function based on the Hamming weight of one
byte of the target register. It is important to notice that 24 bits are not part
of the hypothesis, thus they are contributing as algorithmic noise. This makes
our attack more diﬃcult with respect to a situation where only a single S-box
is considered, but the problem can be easily solved by increasing the number of
collected traces.
Repeated attacks performed by ciphering 600 random plaintexts were com-
puted both for CMOS and MCML technology. In all these cases our attacks
on the CMOS logic were always successful. The diﬀerential trace of the correct
key (plotted in black) is the one that clearly shows the highest value for the
correlation, thus it is clearly distinguishable from the other ones, as can be seen
from Figure 7 (hypotheses based on the Hamming weight of the register), where
the correlation value of ρ(P (t),H) = 1 clearly indicates the guessed key was the
correct one.
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Fig. 8. CPA on MCML technology
As for the SPA, the same CPA attack was performed on the same core im-
plemented using MCML technology. In this case the situation is completely dif-
ferent: in all the experiments in fact, no keys were found. An example of CPA
attack on MCML technology is plotted in Figure 8. As can be seen, the black
line representing the correct key is not distinguishable from the remaining diﬀer-
ential traces that are plotted in gray. Additionally, it can be noticed that, for all
the key guess, the maximum absolute value for the correlation is about 0.17. It
is important to notice that in an attack mounted on a real device, this values are
so small that they are very likely to be completely overshadowed by the noise of
the measurement set-up, making the attack more diﬃcult. Once again, we stress
the fact that the attacks were mounted within a simulation environment, thus
in an ideal condition for an attacker, both in terms of sampling rate accuracy
and absence of noise.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper we introduced a simulation-based methodology for evaluating
the resistance of cryptographic circuits to power analysis attacks. We used our
methodology to evaluate the MCML technology as a possible counter measure
against Side Channel Attacks based on Power Analysis, and demonstrated the
robustness of MCML against the SPA and against the powerful variant of DPA
based on correlation.
Contrary to previous papers on this subject, we did not argue robustness
just qualitatively, but with real attacks. Furthermore, since our approach is based
on SPICE-level simulations, it does not rely on the manufacturing of prototypes,
which allows a more direct experimental study of Power Analysis-resistance.
Our results show that the power traces obtained by simulating two full cores,
implementing the AES algorithm and realized in MCML, are very diﬃcult to
attack, as opposed to a CMOS implementation for which the same attacks were
always successful.
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